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Logicism: a French view of 
archaeological theory founded in 
computational perspective 
ALAIN GALLAY” 
Theory in archaelogy has largely been an anglophone enterprise, and perhaps too inbred 
for its own good. The main French school, known particularly from the work of Alain 
Gallay and Jean-Claude Gardin, was well represented at a CNRS-NSF conference on 
‘Symbolic, structural and semiotic approaches in archaeology’, held at Indiana 
University, Bloomington (IN) in October 1987, where a small group of American, British, 
French and Swiss archaeologists met to confront their theoretical views. Here Alain 
Gallay sets out the fundamentals of the ‘logicist’ position. 
For many years, the anglophone literature on 
archaeological theory has dominated the 
European scene. Even though interest in episte- 
mological problems remains marginal on the 
continent, we would like to show here: 
- that a theoretical reflection does exist in the 
French-speaking archaeological community 
although most everyday archaeological 
practice is not affected by it; 
- that this thought, related to the currents of 
logical empirism and positivism, is radi- 
cally different from some of the most recent 
anglophone approaches, which run closer to 
the subjectivist trend; and that it may consti- 
tute one of the few ways that would allow 
the social sciences in general, and archaeo- 
logy in particular, to emerge from the 
deadlock these studies find themselves in, 
when it comes to going beyond the descrip- 
tive level. 
This survey does not provide a full panorama 
of theoretical archaeology in the French lan- 
guage; it concentrates on a well-defined current 
of thought, that could be called the logicist 
trend inasmuch as a label is needed. This paper 
does not cover the non-theoretical, empirical 
approaches, practised with a certain success by 
many archaeologists, nor the works whose theo- 
retical basis is borrowed from the anglophone 
literature. 
Logicist archaeology thus defined is not 
completely free from contradictions. Its posi- 
tions seem to be more or less radical. Also, in 
many cases, one may observe an important gap 
between theoretical thought and real practice in 
empirical research (see e.g. Gallay 1981a). This 
situation, however, is not surprising since the 
adjustment between theory and practice cannot 
be achieved smoothly and without some contra- 
dictions. 
Although mainly based on the works of J.-Cl. 
Gardin, our interpretation of this movement is 
personal. The following lines are by no means 
the manifesto of any given group, yet they 
derive largely from some of the propositions 
made at the Bloomington meeting. I shall try 
only to bring forth the coherence of some of the 
more basic points by proposing a logical sketch 
of their interrelations. 
An appendix to the bibliography lists the 
French-speaking communications presented at 
the meeting at Indiana University. They will 
eventually be published; since their titles may 
be revised, we will quote them with proper 
reserve. The references given in the text are 
under the form (Author, Bl.) meaning: name of 
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the author, communication given at Bloomington. 
We wish to emphasize here how much the present 
reflections owe to the works and discussions that 
we have held with their authors. 
Theoretical archaeology on the anglophone 
side 
It is not our aim to give a complete review of this 
subject. The currents of thought are many- 
sided, and the accelerated rythm in which ‘new’ 
approaches are being proposed to us, from the 
New archaeology to the numerous so-called 
post-modern archeologies (structural, cogni- 
tive, processual, contextual, symbolic archaeo- 
logies, amongst others), makes it difficult to 
synthesize the anglophone side. 
The papers presented at the Bloomington 
conference show well this diversity. Two main 
currents of thought were discernible. 
First, for some, it is possible to discover laws 
that preside over the development of human 
societies. This mechanistic point of view admits 
that history possesses its proper laws, and that 
these could be modelled on the laws of science. 
These laws affect every cultural domain, from 
the most elementary techno-economical struc- 
tures to the highest ideological aspects. 
Archaeology can lead to the complete recon- 
struction of past societies with their technologi- 
cal, economical, ethnical, social and ideological 
features. 
The language of epistemology and phil- 
osophy of science may serve to establish the 
foundations of our approach to the empirical 
world, and provide the logical basis to our 
interpretation of material remains. 
The second current of thought concentrated 
on the search, other than in art or science, of a 
third way. Its characteristics seem to be the 
following: 
- In the Universe, man forms a highly 
complex specific entity. The intrusion of 
symbolics in his culture makes him a totally 
exceptional being. It is thus impossible to 
use the same approaches in the study of man 
as those that have proved their worth in the 
natural sciences. 
- The Human Sciences thus form a ‘third 
culture’, distinct from Art and Literature as 
well as from the Science of nature. 
- It must particularly concentrate on the 
reconstruction of symbols and world-views 
that, thanks to their originality, establish the 
specificity of human societies and set up 
their cultural choice. 
- The approach to human reality, present and 
past, must take into account the subjectivity 
as well as the cultural and affective identity 
of the observer. 
This position brings the hermeneutic current 
to mind (Gardin, Bl.). It is only by integrating 
the observer’s personal and social parameters 
that we can reach understanding from ‘inside’ 
human phenomena. 
Consequently, it is not possible, nor desirable 
to validate the proposed constructs by referring 
to empirical facts. Such constructs can only be 
regarded as comments on reality, about which 
we are merely able to express personal judge- 
ment. The proposed constructs thus turn out to 
be short-lived and cannot generate cumulative 
knowledge. 
A positivist criticism 
These positions may be subject to a positivist 
criticism, opposed to the emerging trends in the 
Human Sciences. 
This criticism is inseparable from the ideas 
that J.-Cl. Gardin has developed over a number 
of years within the context of logicism. Logi- 
cism is a reflection on the epistemological 
nature of archaeology, and further, of all human 
sciences. It is based on the analysis of archaeo- 
logical ‘constructs’, or more simply of archaeo- 
logical publications. Thus, logicism does not 
concern, in a first step at least, the archaeologi- 
cal remains themselves, but what archaeo- 
logists say about them (Lagrange 1973; Gardin 
1974; Gardin & Lagrange 1975). The need for 
such a reflection appeared very early in the 
development of archaeology, ever since the 
applications of first mechanized and then 
computer techniques were used in the creation 
of data-banks. Logicism is therefore analogous 
to the utilization of computers insofar as their 
use demands very strict logical and formal 
requirements. This practical epistemology is 
free of technical problems inasmuch as it 
tackles the question of the scientific status of the 
analysed constructs. The main concerns conse- 
quently focus on both the formal qualities of 
these constructs and their efficiency in master- 
ing reality, which amounts to asking not only 
what they ‘are’ but also what they ‘do’. 
The logicist analysis of archaeological texts 
would nevertheless remain futile if it did not 
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pursue the search for a new rhetoric in better 
accordance with the requirements of scientific 
knowledge. From the very beginning, exper- 
iments have been carried out to that end in the 
preparation of codes (Digard et al. 1975; Gardin 
1978) and data-banks, in the field of typologies 
(Gallay 1981a) as well as in the explanatory 
sphere (Gallay 1981b). They have permitted a 
better understanding of the qualities and limits 
of this approach. 
We will also underline the fact that logicist 
research follows in a way, the same stages as the 
ones used in the realization of an archaeological 
construct. 
The first works focussed on problems con- 
nected with the description of objects and their 
integration into data-banks (Gardin 1958; 1963). 
In the 1970s, J.-Cl. Gardin devoted himself to 
the study of the ‘intermediate’ stages of the 
constructs. He particularly confronted the prob- 
lems posed by the University of Geneva in 
1976-7, and his response was the origin of his 
‘Theoretical Archaeology’ (Gardin 1979). 
Today, it is the interpretation of data that lies 
at the hearth of the reflections concerning the 
application of artificial intelligence and expert 
systems in archaeology (Gardin 1987; Gardin et 
We can now summarize the main lines of our 
criticism of anglophone theories as seen from a 
scientific as well as logicistic point of view. 
Ql. 1987). 
I 1 
Human societies form extremely complex sys- 
tems that are open to their environment. 
Knowing that the diachronical evolution of an 
open system is not foreseeable, it is therefore 
impossible to propose laws of history. Archaeo- 
logists use the notion of system in a naive way, 
which does not at all correspond to its applica- 
tion in science. The chosen variable are far too 
general and as a rule can neither be subject only 
by a rough estimate to quantification nor tested 
and confirmed through facts. How can one 
discover, in archaeological facts, anything 
plainly expressing social hierarchy, complexity 
of a society, population density, potentialities 
or ecological limits of a given region? (Gallay 
1986a). 
2 
Archaeological constructs usually present 
themselves as a structure whose lower and more 
the higher ones, also the most fragile, concern 
the social and ideological context of the evolu- 
tion of societies. 
In the intermediate levels, we usually find 
propositions of a spatio-temporal nature 
(attribution of remains to a certain period and a 
particular region) and then others of a techno- 
logical and economical purport. 
At the lowest level, complex inference chains 
are based on material remains. Analysis and 
synthesis of data allow us to reach progressively 
at the highest level the conclusions of the work: 
‘EXPLANATION’ AT THE HIGH LEVEL: MEANING 
ideology and symbolic structures 
society and historical events 
technology and economy 
spatial and temporal coordinates of remains 
description of material remains 
DESCRIPTIVE BASE OF OUR CONSTRUCTS: 
MATTER 
A wide consensus seems to exist in the 
archaeological community concerning the ways 
to deal with the lower parts of the structure. 
Therefore, we need not elaborate on this sub- 
ject, even if technical problems remain (easily 
controllable though not always mastered). 
Divergences become more visible, from one 
school to the other, as one rises in the hierarchy 
of ‘explanations’. 
Logicist archaeology addresses words of 
caution to the anglophone archaeologist eager 
to reach ever more quickly the higher expla- 
natory levels. It is certainly desirable to gain 
ground in this direction but the way to do so is 
still to be discovered. The partial nature of the 
remains always sets an absolute limit on our 
reconstructions, at a level which is at present 
rather difficult to locate. 
“ 
J 
Criticism of semiological and philosophical 
approaches can be based on the idea that 
language is a tool which allows the capture of 
realities ‘out there’, external to the obsever. 
Since these realities are numerous and the 
apprehension of them fragmented, we should 
try to clarify the univocal relations that hold 
between languages and realities. 
- The language used in epistemology and 
DhilosoDhv of science is concerned with secure parts concern material remains, while I J  
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scientific discourse and not with the phe- 
nomena to which scientific discourse refers. 
- The language of science basically concerns 
the physical world. It is nevertheless 
assumed that it can apply to the intellectual 
and symbolic activity of man. 
- Man has always tried to apprehend the 
world with means other than those pro- 
posed by science, in particular with symbo- 
lical concepts. The languages created to that 
end, myths, beliefs, are distinct. They are 
not of the same nature as the language of 
Sciences. It is therefore utopian to use the 
language of philosophy of science to appre- 
hend the physical world of archaeological 
remains. It is also necessary to distinguish 
clearly the languages of early man, which 
are made up of symbolical constructs. Only 
then would it be possible to avoid a confu- 
sion frequently made in certain works that 
claim their belonging to symbolical 
archaeology. 
Faced with this, we may ask whether an 
examination of the practices of natural sciences 
rather than any human science, would not 
throw some light on the kind of symbolic tool 
which is needed for apprehending the archaeo- 
logical reality. In fact, one cannot help being 
struck, as we shall see further on, by the 
similarity in the approaches of disciplines such 
as cosmology in astrophysics, plate tectonics in 
geology, evolutionary biology in the life 
sciences, and the study of the evolution of 
human societies in anthropology and in history 
- all those studies that are concerned with the 
change of complex things over time (Gallay 
1986a). 
Let us quickly add that similarity does not 
mean that languages used in these different 
approaches are identical, but rather that the 
epistemological issues are comparable. 
4 
We think there is no ‘third culture’. The social 
Sciences have always presented a hybrid posi- 
tion resorting simultaneously to scientistic, if 
not scientific method, and to literary 
approaches. There are only two ways to appre- 
hend the world, the one used by Arts and 
Literature, and the other proposed by Sciences. 
To mix the two somehow results in a regrettable 
waste. It is consequently useful to play the game 
of science, even for human affairs, although this 
way seems, at first sight, long, difficult and far 
too reductionist. This conclusion seems to 
impose itself when the meagre results obtained 
by the contribution of the ‘symbolic and struc- 
tural’ approaches in archaeology are compared 
to the progress achieved by the most traditional 
archaeologies. 
- The so-called structural approaches pro- 
posed by anglophone archaeologists, where 
the influence of structuralist works in 
French (F. de Saussure, C1. Levi-Strauss) is 
clear, although this influence has become 
minor in France itself. 
- The logicist trend, more specifically 
dedicated to the analysis of archaeological 
discourse (see for example the pioneer work 
by Lagrange & Bonnet 1978). Its conclusions 
perfectly agree with our position (Gallay, 
Bl): we do not see what the novelty and the 
specificity of a so-called ‘structural and 
symbolic archaeology’ could be. Any 
approach of a complex phenomenon in a 
systemic way, calling upon entities and 
relations, may be considered structural. 
Therefore, this designation is a platitude. 
The notion of structure is useful, but the 
concept, widely used in all sciences, is not 
new. As to the world of symbols, it is 
advisable to distinguish clearly the 
observers’ symbols, whose nature and per- 
formances the logicist trend tries to study 
with precision, from the symbols of the 
observed which are beyond the reach of 
archaeological research, because of their 
supposed or real arbitrariness. 
7.-Cl. Gardin’s analysis (Bl.) focuses on: 
5 
The introduction of subjectivity in the approach 
adopted by anglophone archaeologists leads to 
a logical contradiction that is enough to impose 
the kind of dissociation between object and 
subject, that led to the growth of the sciences of 
nature in the 18th century. 
Anglophone authors simultaneously insist 
on: 
- the benefits resulting from integrating perso- 
nal subjectivity in our approach of human 
reality; 
- the necessity of criticizing this very subjec- 
tivity, on the basis of the ideological and 
social context in which the subject evolves. 
It is clearly impossible to integrate subjec- 
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tivity and at the same time try to get rid of it by 
underlying its probable roots in the researchers’ 
social, ideological or personal history. A more 
economical path, in the perspective of practical 
epistemology, is to try to eliminate it. 
Although not everyone agrees with this (see 
Molino, Bl.), it seems to us possible to reduce if 
not suppress the part of subjectivity in our 
interpretations by observing a double reorien- 
tation, namely a restriction of our cognitive 
ambitions and a systematic call on validation. 
It is evident that the material remains studied 
by the archaeologist will never permit the 
reconstitution of all aspects of the life of early 
man. Therefore, we shall probably have to 
definately renounce trying to attain certain 
ambitious objectives, particularly those con- 
cerning the organization of society or religious 
beliefs. On the other hand, we must maintain a 
dialogue with reality, which means suggesting 
only those explanations that can be confirmed 
by facts and results that other researchers are 
able to reproduce through other ways. A shared 
subjectivity, bearing on a limited part of the 
external world and to confirmations by facts, 
cease to be a subjectivity and becomes a reality 
till proof of the contrary. Science does not 
proceed otherwise. Logicist archaeology thus 
find itself opposed to the trends developed by 
certain anglophone authors under considera- 
tion, since it tries to limit subjectivism as much 
as possible through a continual dialogue with 
reality. 
Structuring the various approaches 
Astrophysics, plate tectonics, evolution biology 
and archaeology have in common the following 
features: 
- they are empirical sciences, whose 
respective domains include the Past. 
- the evidence for past phenomena is subject 
to various distortions: reduced information, 
effects of perspectives, etc. 
- in all cases, reality is systemic and therefore 
exhibits an uncertain and uncontrollable 
component in its historical evolution. 
These different disciplines consequently find 
themselves at the junction of three specific 
forms of knowledge, whose structure and heu- 
ristic limits should be fully understood: 
1 
History, that is to say the reconstitution, on the 
basis of incomplete informations, of various 
scenarios that have characterized the evolution 
of things throughout time. History is, as P. 
Veyne (1971) has shown, essentially descrip- 
tive. Through a patient work of reconstruction 
which involves cross-comparisons of historical 
documents, the scholar tries to reconstitute 
events and facts based on a forever partial 
documentation. He may complete his informa- 
tion by assuming certain regularities in order to 
give more consistency to the proposed nar- 
ratives. The clear boundaries of such a game are 
of two sorts: 
- The documentation is incomplete, the pro- 
posed scenarios are therefore amenable to 
revisions as new discoveries are made. 
- History is observed and cannot be explained 
insofar as it is concerned with evolution of 
complex systems in time. There are no laws 
of history. 
2 
Regularities, empirically induced from the 
examination of scenarios according to a primi- 
tive intuition of the presence of a certain coher- 
ence in our world. We can call this empirical 
knowledge, unexplained, that constitutes the 
foundation of most human actions, ‘artisan 
knowledge’. 
In archaeology, it can be found in three 
forms, in a decreasing order of accuracy: 
- numerical correlations between two cate- 
gories of phenomena, continuous or dis- 
continuous; 
- typologies integrating two or more spheres 
of reality, after each one has been par- 
titioned; 
- discursive relations expressed in natural 
language, which can be formalized as 
sequence of re-write expressions: ‘IF Pi 
The limits of typological knowledge, impli- 
cit or explicit, are well known: 
- a correlation between two phenomena does 
not necessarily provide an explanation of 
either; 
- empirically perceived regularities can be 
based on a poor knowledge of reality, even 
though they give us a predicitive control 
over the latter; 
- the most profound theories are often 
counter-intuitive. 
THEN Pi + 1’. 
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3 
Laws, expressing, to a degree, our understand- 
ing of certain partial aspects of reality, thereby 
justifying the reference to regularities. Instead 
of the word law, we prefer the term mechan- 
ism, better adapted to the practical episte- 
mology that we are trying to promote and 
nearer to the everyday scientific processes. 
These mechanisms are the only admissible 
explanations in a scientific approach. It is 
necessary to distinguish this concept from the 
notion of ‘explanation’ in the broad sense as it 
is sometimes used in archaeology. In fact, 
explanations are often nothing but regularities 
of a higher order (Gallay, Bl.). 
The limits of this kind of approach are clear: 
- the underscored mechanisms can only 
explain restricted areas of reality; 
- they can only be brought to the fore by 
observation of the living world: any hope to 
discover mechanisms by the sole observa- 
tion of the past is utopian; 
- the only possible explanations are of a 
functionalist kind; 
- they bear on the genesis of regularities built 
up on empirical observations, and in no 
case on historical scenarios, so that we have 
to reject global causality in history. 
Let us conclude this section by underlining 
the close convergence between this triple 
opposition ‘scenarios - regularities - mechan- 
isms’ and the three stages of archaeological 
research distinguished by J.-Cl, Gardin (1979), 
‘description, typology, explanation’, except for 
the slightly different meaning given to the term 
‘explanation’ (FIGURE 1). 
The presentation of scenarios in history fell- 
ows an eminently descriptive pattern. The per- 
ception of regularities always results from a 
typological approach. Finally, explanations at 
a higher level often refer to a mechanism of 
some sort. 
The analysis of archaeological constructs 
Aware of the extreme fragility of our current 
archaeological constructs, the logicist approach 
first grounds itself on a critical analysis of the 
latter. Through schematizations of archaeologi- 
cal reasoning, it attemps to reveal the founda- 
tions of the proposed interpretations as well as 
their flaws. Yet, beyond this purely critical 
aspect, the search for new patterns of thought 
and expression becomes apparent. 
ANTHROPOLOGY 
regularities 
mechanisms scenar ios 
SCIENCE HISTORY 
_ _  
Ce explanatory Constructs 
C t  typological constructs 
Ce - C c  
explanatory cornpilatory 
constructs constructs 
EXPLANATIONS DESCRIPTIONS 
B 
regularities 
ARCHAEOLOGY ARCHAEOLOGY 
ETHNO 
b “ t  
- ~ 
FIGURE 1. Articulation of various approaches in 
sciences of the Past. 
A Relations between history, anthropology and 
science. 
B Relations between the different stages ofarchaeo- 
logical research. 
C Relation between archaeology, as  a descriptive 
and typological discipline and ethnoarchaeology, a 
typological and explanatory discipline. 
Notice the perfect homology of the three diagrams. 
Starting from the ‘sense’ archaeologists 
attribute to phenomena, the logicist approach 
tries to specify the ‘measures’ which, when 
applied to archaeological remains, would be 
able to account for the generation of that sense 
(Francfort, Bl.). 
Logicist schematization 
The analysis of largely interpretative works 
shows that we are in the presence of networks 
of interrelated propositions, which can be for- 
malized as chains of IF . . . THEN expressions. 
It is therefore possible to represent the argu- 
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mentation observed in a written paper as a 
graph whose nodes are the various proposi- 
tions formulated by the author while the 
arrows indicate the authorized derivations. 
This kind of structure brought to the fore by 
J.-Cl. Gardin (1979: 175-2'02) allows a stricter, 
more logical form of writing or formulating 
texts originally written in the discursive style; 
it also helps to detect deficiencies in the argu- 
mentation. 
In particular, a basic feature of archaeologi- 
cal constructs then becomes manifest, namely 
the fact that many derivations presented by 
archaeologists as if they were necessary are in 
fact merely plausible (Gardin et al. 1981). 
This kind of ambiguity in analysis of mater- 
ial remains has two origins: 
- Material remains are only a very small part 
of the living reality; relying on them alone 
entails a huge loss of information, which 
compromises the high level objectives we 
would like to reach; 
- Archaeology, as an empirical science, is 
mostly confronted to inference prob- 
lems whose solutions are never univo- 
cal (Gallay, Bl.). 
Relations to expert systems 
As it was recently brought out (Gardin et al. 
data 
{Po} 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
SCHEMATIZATIONS 
EXPERT SYSTEMS 
3 
1987), the logicist schematization presents an 
undisputable similarity with the structure of 
expert systems in which rules of production 
also take on the form of propositions of the IF 
. . . THEN kind (FIGURE 2 ) .  I t  is therefore 
tempting to try to formulate traditional works 
according to the principles that govern the 
formation of an expert system. These rewriting 
exercises are undoubtedly useful insofar as: 
- they make it possible to propose firmer 
diagnoses about remains of the past, by 
bringing out the deficiencies and the limits 
of the inferences sequences and thought 
processes; 
- they underline all the 'gaps' (or conceptual 
jumps) in the reasoning process, which in 
fact increase in number as one tries to reach 
interpretations of a higher level (of a social 
or ideological sort, Francfort, Bl.). 
In the present state of research, however we 
must be careful not to confuse these analytical 
approaches with the creation of operational 
expert systems, applicable to the interpretation 
of various corpuses (Fischer 1987). 
The reasons for this are the following: - 
The proposed reconstructions are most 
often based upon the sole publications, in 
which the argumentation is never totally 
explicit, without direct collaboration with 
operations 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
r----l 
rules v 
FIGURE 2. Analogy 
between the normal 
structure of Iogicist 
schematizations of 
archaeological 
constructs and expert 
systems. [After Gardin 
1987, figure 3.)  
available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003598X00075554
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 10 Jul 2017 at 15:06:19, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
34 ALAIN GALLAY 
the authors. It is therefore difficult, if not 
impossible, to restore all the mobilized 
implicit knowledge that is nevertheless 
necessary to constitute an expert system. 
Two strategies are available to the analyst, 
according whether he favours a forward 
chaining (from facts to meaning) or a back- 
ward chaining (from meaning to facts) in 
choosing the corpus needed for the con- 
struction of the expert system (FIGURE 3). In 
both cases, the limits of the exercise are 
evident, as explained below. 
In the case of forward chaining, it may be 
tempting to cumulate various interpreta- 
tions of the same corpus, as proposed by 
different authors. 
The rules derived from several traditional 
and generally diverging constructs are most 
often multivocal. Therefore the diagnosis 
very quickly proves impossible as one 
ascends in the construct (Lagrange & Renaud 
1983; 1984). 
In the case of backward chaining, it is 
possible, as already suggested in the intro- 
duction to this section, to begin with the 
interpretation given by the author and seek 
the foundations of the construct in various 
facts. 
One then realizes that the resulting expla- 
nations are more often than not of an ad hoc 
nature. The expert system does simulate the 
reasoning of a given author (or group of 
authors), but remains unuseable in other con- 
texts; its application to other corpuses may lead 
to aberrations. 
H.-P. Francfort (Bl) gives an excellent 
example of this situation in his experiment with 
an expert system revolving around the notion of 
State and based upon the most commonly 
accepted reasonings followed to establish the 
existence of such a social entity (Childe, Wright, 
Tosi, Johnson, etc.). The expert system, taught 
by these examples what the defining char- 
acteristics of a state are, can be applied to other 
corpuses. It suggests that the Neolithic of 
Wessex, as well as societies of ants, should be 
regarded as State societies. 
Whatever the case may be, traditional 
archaeological discourse remains too loose to 
authorize the creation of real tools for the 
formation of diagnoses other than in the ‘lower’ 
parts of our constructs. The building of pseudo- 
expert systems nevertheless remains very 
STRATEGY A 
backward  chaining 
SENSE 
explanation 
base 
............................................. 
facts base 
I MATTER : REMAINS 
STRATEGY B 
forward chaining 
SENSE 
explanation 1 ............ explanation 2 L4 facts  base 
MATTER : REMAINS 
FIGURE 3.  The two strategies used in the design of 
expert systems based on the logicist analysis of 
archaeofogical constructs. 
useful as a first stage of the analysis; it enables 
us to assess the great frailty of archaeological 
constructs of the higher levels. Thus we observe 
that no true measure of archaeological facts 
usually exists, as a basis for ‘making sense’ of 
them, except in the lower parts of our con- 
structs. It is therefore incumbent upon us to 
restrict our ambitions and offer a better defi- 
nition of the true ground of archaeological 
knowledge. 
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The ground of archaeological knowledge 
Logicist analyses must accordingly lead to a 
search for a better relation of sense (‘expla- 
nation’) to matter (the remains), through proper 
measures, the word ‘measure’ being taken in the 
literal as well as figurative sense (Francfort, Bl). 
The movement is here opposite to the preceding 
one; we begin with measure in order to reach 
meaning following an empirical process. 
The reality of archaeological remains 
Given the freedom of archaeological discourse, 
the remains discovered in the course of an 
excavation, seem to exhibit a relative reliability, 
even granted that the subject partially composes 
its object of study while digging, collecting, 
recording and providing a first description of 
the preserved traces (Molino, Bl.). Therefore, 
the archaeologist’s first duty to explain the 
presence and the nature of these remains, 
whose formation is far from being simple. 
Restricting the questionnaire 
We shall never lay enough stress on the limited 
character of the remains. Contrary to the sug- 
gestions made by certain historians, we would 
accordingly restrict ourselves to the sole ques- 
tions that can be resolved. 
‘The price to pay for the control of our 
inferences is the impoverishment of our con- 
cepts, in keeping with the local and relative 
aspect of our approaches’ (Francfort, Bl.). 
Technological sequences and production of 
remains 
One of the most promising fields of research is 
indisputably the study of technological sequen- 
ces that underlie the production of archaeologi- 
cal remains (Francfort, Bl.; Perles, Bl.). 
Man is a producer of objects, objects which 
are the main reflection of his palaeontological 
and historical trajectory as Leroi-Gourhan 
admirably demonstrated in his book Le Geste et 
la parole (1964/75). Therefore, it is not utopian 
to build a history of man on the basis of material 
objects whose preservation through time is 
possible. 
This history may be based on the study of the 
operational sequence leading to the observed 
object, be it palace or hut, pottery, tool or jewel, 
temple or tomb, and beyond that to the remains 
that have been preserved to this day. 
By concentrating on a history of the produc- 
tion of remains (including, at an intermediate 
stage, the production of objects), we may elimi- 
nate the problem of consumption, which is out 
of reach on account of its negative nature. 
The two aspects of our remains, their form 
and their position in space (the only criteria 
allowing a distinction between archaeological 
and natural objects) are the result of a sequence 
of technological acts (and of perturbations due 
to the influence of the natural environment) 
which can be identified quite easily and whose 
signification, needIess to say, extends far 
beyond the strict context of production tech- 
niques. 
Thus, C. Perks (Bl.) attemps to bring out the 
various operational sequences leading to chip- 
ped lithic remains, as they are found in exca- 
vations, often in large numbers, and expressing 
the various strategies binding man to matter: 
acquisition of raw materials, production and 
maintenance of tools. 
In his approach of the proto-urban site of 
Shortugai, H.-P. Francfort (1984, Bl., & forth- 
coming) follows a closely comparable pro- 
cedure by attempting a characterization of the 
discovered remains in terms of the quantity of 
processed materials and the complexity of the 
operational sequences. 
The introduction of measure 
This kind of approach alone gives us some hope 
of a valid relation between sense and matter by 
means of true measures (Francfort, Bl.), as well 
as of a way out of the two deadlocks with which 
archaeology is today confronted. Some 
measures do not lead to sense, when data 
analysis techniques, much in fashion amongst 
the archaeologists, are applied to badly posed 
archaeological problems, they provide no 
useful knowledge, although the technique may 
be formally correct. Other measures lead to too 
much sense, when major physico-mathematical 
models, like catastrophe theory, the general 
systems theory or the theory of order by fluc- 
tuation, are applied to badly defined archaeo- 
logical realities in a metaphorical way. 
Though the need to introduce measure has 
been felt in every science, it is nevertheless 
advisable to recall the necessary conditions of 
its application. 
1 The problems posed by the introduction of 
measure, or in a more general way of any 
kind of indicator, differ from the problems 
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posed by the theories, for the indicator is not 
part of the produced theory. 
The choice of an indicator or of any mea- 
suring device must be an application of 
some law of physics, through a clear isomor- 
phism (such as the expansion of a column of 
mercury as a function of temperature) link- 
ing the observation to the measured 
phenomenon. Thus, on the site of Shortugai, 
H.-P. Francfort (1984; 1988) uses an indi- 
cator borrowed from the laws of thermo- 
dynamics and based on the following three 
criteria: matter, information and energy; it 
enables him to measure, through different 
levels of the site, the evolution of the 
complexity of the technological sequences 
leading to the formation of remains. 
An objective estimator of man’s action on 
his environment is thus provided, conven- 
tionally linked to the notion of urbanization. 
The phenomenon to be measured must be 
precisely defined. It is therefore necessary to 
give a preliminary definition of the phenom- 
enon that is to be studied, and a non- 
ambiguous relation must be set down 
between a material fact and its signification. 
4 This relation can only be founded on known 
mechanisms of the production of remains. 
This last comment accounts for the need to 
construct a reference knowledge allowing a 
reasonable formulation of the relations between 
material facts and signification. This question 
will be taken up in the last paragraph. 
2 
3 
The construction of a reference knowledge 
One cannot stress enough the original nature of 
the questions that must be resolved in archaeo- 
logy. As Molino emphasizes (Bl.) ‘the corre- 
lations that we try to bring out cannot be 
compared to the correlations established in 
sociology (or as a general rule in any human 
science) for we do not have the means to know 
more about those activities beyond the traces 
they left’. 
The remains never talk for themselves, and 
sense, beyond mere description, can only come 
from outside (FIGURE 4). 
Faced with this uarticular situation. archaeo- 
logy, oddly enougi, lacks a science ofreference. 
Palynology applied to the archaeological record 
is based on a knowledge of botany and cannot be provide the- link between both disciplines 
conceived as an isolated development, for paly- 
nology depends for its insight on the regula- For a long time, ethnoarchaeology has 
(FIGURE IC). 
rities observed by botanists. This situation is the 
same for all the other so-called ‘subsidiary’ 
sciences such as geology, zoology, etc. In the 
same way, it is in the study of the living reality 
that archaeology must find the foundations of 
its hypotheses relating to the observed regula- 
rities, by establishing privileged links between 
material facts and their signification. Ethnoar- 
chaeology meets this requirement and now 
seems indispensable to many researchers 
(Aurenche 1982; 1985a; 1985b; Aurenche & 
Calley 1984; Aurenche & Desfarges 1983; Roux 
1985a; Gallay 1986b). 
Actualism (Molino, Bl.) has been criticized, 
however, insofar as the usable references all 
belong to the context of Homo sapiens sapiens: 
it is hard to imagine how to establish a usable 
comparative knowledge in the case of the most 
ancient hominid groups. The objection is of 
importance, yet it is not totally insuperable. 
1 We must first draw attention to the fact that 
comparable situations also exist at the level 
of Homo sapiens sapiens. The first urban 
civilizations of Mesopotamia or Middle 
America have no equivalents in the present 
world that might help us to understand the 
structure of such societies. The problem is 
therefore much more general than the above 
objection would lead us to suppose. 
This problem can be partly solved if we 
recall the limitations imposed upon our 
quest of knowledge and the necessary 
restrictions of the fields of investigation for 
which these references are needed. This 
vision does not exclude broader concep- 
tions but the latter will proceed from the 
crossing of local approaches that may 
include, as far as the most primitive 
hominids are concerned, the primates still 
observable today. 
Such recombinations will certainly make for 
a better apprehension of situations that have 
no equivalent in present or recent contexts. 
Whereas archaeology is entirely situated on 
the main road from regularities to scenarios 
(Gallay 1986a), ethnoarchaeology lies on the 
road from mechanisms to regularities (even if 
the documents it uses are historical ones). 
This articulation permits us to lay stress on 
the central position of the regularities that 
2 
3 
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ON GLOVED HAND 
FIGURE 4. 
of material remains proceeds by confronting archaeoIogica1 fact with externai observations. 
The above example concerns the interpretation of a stele depicting a man carrying a large bird on his 
glovedfist. [After Gallay 1986: figure 2 3 . )  
The mechanism of archaeological interpretation according to J.-Cl. Gardin. The interpretation 
searched for its identity: it was notably accused 
of giving only negative reports concerning the 
eminently ambiguous nature of the remains. 
Numerous works place themselves in this 
perspective: their results are limited to a warn- 
ing against the possibility of making material 
facts say what the archaeologists want them to 
say (Gallay 1981a; Roux 1985b). It seems to me 
that this situation results from an improper 
centring of the objectives, exclusively 
dedicated to the study of regularities. In my 
opinion, we should give more attention to the 
study of mechanisms belonging to the field 
covered by ethnoarchaeology in order to come 
out of the deadlock. One cannot help but be 
struck, in this connection by the convergence in 
the design of numerous recent ethnoarchaeo- 
logical research works. 
Thus, A.M. & P. Petrequin (1984) study the 
development of archaeological layers as they 
form beneath the huts of sea- and lake-side 
settlements of the Cotonou lagoon in Benin. The 
proposed model is based on the comprehension 
of human and natural mechanisms that 
determine the distribution of the remains in the 
refuse layers. Its relevance for the analysis of 
archaeological levels in Northern alpine lake 
dwellings is consequently unquestionable. V. 
Roux (BI.), exploring the relationships that may 
exist between the wheel manufacture of pottery 
and the concept of craft specialization, shows 
by means of psychomotor tests that learning the 
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potter’s wheel is incomparably longer and more 
difficult than learning the coil method. Special- 
ization and the wheel manufacturing technique 
seem to be linked in a univocal way in the 
direction Pi (wheel manufacturing technique) 
to Pi + 1 (specialization). One of the mechan- 
isms of the appearance of pottery specialization 
is consequently demonstrated on firm experi- 
mental bases provided by disciplines outside 
archaeology. 
We have ourselves suggested, in a study of 
Touareg campsites (Gallay 1988) that the only 
means to ‘understand’ the spatial distribution of 
remains abandoned around a campfire lies in 
the description of the operational sequences 
bound to these remains: the preparation of a 
meal, the consumption of food, the laying-out of 
a spatial area dependent on lavatory customs, 
etc. 
In the first two cases, the search for mechan- 
isms leading to the observed regularities allows 
useful overlaping with other scientific disci- 
plines. As they increase, these overlaps will be 
the sign of a growing intergration of etnoar- 
chaeology and archaeology in the field of 
science. 
Conclusions 
In relation to the diversity of approaches 
reflected in the anglophone communications 
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